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Even of there Is No God, Act as if there Is: Thinking In Jewish XXXI

Even of there Is No God, Act as if there Is: Thinking In Jewish XXXI

Even of there Is No God, Act as if there Is: Thinking In Jewish XXXI

This past Saturday while sitting in my Rabbi’s Library after Shabbat morning services I listened to a most disturbing proposition, that God allows tragedy in the world in order to create a vital need for God. At the same time one of the congregants proposed the grand idea that even though God knows the results of all actions, God allows us to have free will which includes the ability to act with evil intentions. Let me tackle the free will issue first and then I’ll try to address the former idea that God allows evil in order to create a place for God.

The issue of free will is an easy one for me. Either there is a God who is omniscient, all knowing, in which case there can be no free will simply because God knows every action one takes and therefore one’s life is pre-determined. All that exists under this construction is the illusion of free will; the human being acting freely without external constraints or conditions controlling one’s choices is but an illusion if the outcome is predestined. Claiming an omniscient God who surrenders the ability to determine the will of any or all human beings affording humanity free will is like having one’s cake and eating it too. The very concept is a contradiction in terms. Omniscience and free will cancel one another out. Either one has free will in which case there is no room for an omniscient God or one’s life and actions are predetermined by an omniscient creator God and there is no way out of the destiny one is created to complete.

For my part, I reject the very notion of omniscience and therefore reject the very idea that a creator God controls anything in my universe. I have free will and yet I choose to act with ethical intentions. I am not, however, surprised when others act with evil intentions. Free will provides one with a choice and sometimes that choice is rather difficult to make. But because I am able to act freely I must also embrace the very idea that the universe in which I live, for a brief time, is quite random and without teleological purpose. I live in an absurd universe, a universe of chance, of probabilities, of good, of evil, of risk, of reward, a universe without meaning except for the meaning that each individual contributes to the fabric of our intertwined lived-experiences.

The very idea that a God allows evil in order to create a place of God is obscene. If this is the image of the creator God of monotheism then that God is a sadist and unworthy of worship. That God allows bombs to be placed behind children and adults to create a desire for God’s protection in survivors and witnesses to the tragic outcome of a bombing as took place at the Boston Marathon is without honor, ethics or morals. A God that is so insecure that God requires tragedy to induce desire (I think fear is a better word here) makes that God unworthy of worship. A God that allows women and children to be destroyed and maimed by the actions of one predestined to plant such a bomb fails to follow his own edict that one has the obligation to care for the widow, the orphan and the stranger; to violate one’s own commandments is to make one unworthy of worship. The very idea that God allows violence, war, pestilence and famine raises some interesting questions. First, If God is God and can stop the violence and doesn’t, then God is a sadist. If, secondly, God is God and cannot stop the violence then God is not omnipotent and is, therefore, unworthy of fear and trembling. Finally, if God is God and is simply indifferent to the violence then God is nothing but a passive deity unworthy of worship for God will not interfere with the ways of mankind. Violent acts, wars, and other acts of evil do not turn me toward God rather they act to turn me away from a creator God.

So what am I doing in Synagogue on Saturday morning. Yes, I am still an atheist but I am also a Jew and I enjoy the company of the congregation. There is a great deal of joy in the congregation and if the price I have to pay for the congregation is to sit for an hour and a half in prayer (I actually use the time to meditate rather than to pray) that is a small price to pay. As Emmanuel Levinas argued, even if there is no God, one is obligated to act as if there is.

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Belief as Desire: Thinking In Jewish XXX

There is indeed a problem with the whole idea of believing in something because one wants to rather than because the evidence pushes one in that direction.
Alastair Hannay, Introductory Essay to Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death

Belief as Desire: Thinking In Jewish XXX

Belief as Desire: Thinking In Jewish XXX

Believers often define faith as belief in something without evidence; a deeply felt attachment to an idea or principle that, when closely examined would simply fall apart. Some rely on a belief system to explain the unexplained (please note I did not use the term unexplainable simply because, given enough time, all things are explainable but some things today remain unexplained) often sticking to older, yet no longer credible, constructions (e.g., the creation of the universe in six days by a creator God no longer is credible in a universe now known to be billions of years old). Still others claim to have experienced personal miracles in their lives and can only attribute those miracles to the intervention of God or Jesus or some saint or another with no other empirical evidence other than personal experience to back up their claims. Many of these stem from arguments of incredulity which basically go like this: “I can’t think of any other reason for ‘this’ to be therefore it must be the hand of a creator God because nothing else explains whatever ‘this’ is.”

People of faith, especially those who conger a teleological purpose coupled with an eschatological end of times, seem to recognize that their core beliefs are mythological in nature but that all will be revealed when the messiah comes or returns depending on which eschatological story one takes as being the ‘truth.’ It seems that the messiah may appear in the very next moment of time or sometime in the distant future (while some believe in the imminent appearance of the messiah without the ability to attach to that appearance a definite time or place).

Here’s the rub; the very belief in a purpose to the universe, to the very earth we walk upon, to the core of existence is a belief system that may or may not be true. What if, for example, there were no purpose, that the universe, the earth, our very existence were merely the result of probabilities resulting from the physics of the big bang. If this is the case, claiming there must be a purpose to life, that life itself must be meaningful as conditioned by the imposition of meaning or purpose by a creator God, has no foundation. Claiming that there is a teleological purpose is nothing if not the incredulity of belief. It overlooks evidence.

If there is no intrinsic meaning for our very existence is it possible to create meaning or is all lost? If the very core of human life is meaningless, how does one not dispair? If one sees oneself bound to a chain of events stemming from the teleological, if one is, in this sense, bound to a core of sin and redemption where redemption is the reward for living itself, there is little available to the human being but a dispair arising from unfulfilled desire for redemption. If, on the other hand, one addresses life as being in the moment, that one is embedded in the flow of life itself, almost like standing in a river rushing downstream, then one is able to adjust to the vagaries that arise from the changing flow without teleological hope ruling the day. Sometimes the river runs slowly, sometimes rapidly, sometimes the water level is low and sometimes it is flooding, all events that are predictable yet randomly occurring. It is said that one can never stand in the same river twice. What one can do is experience the flow rather than focusing on how one may be redeemed from it.

To remove the teleological along with the idea of eschatological redemption conditioned on the appearance of the messiah does not, however remove response-ability from the equation of life. It does remove conditional response-ability bound up in sin and redemption freeing it from the dispair tied to desire. Once the burdens of fear based desire are removed one’s response-ability is simply an ethical response to the other [person], not one based in fear of punishment or desire for redemption but simply because it is the right thing to do. By acting for the welfare of the other one extends the interiority of the self to the exteriority of the other while incorporating the uniqueness of the other into one’s on lived-experience. No need to condition the obligation to act as a response-able human being, to the contrary, one must act without reservation and without expectation for any reward or recognition or the act is not response-able, rather it is bound up in self interest and self preservation.

 

Private Ryan’s Question

Private Ryan's Question

Private Ryan’s Question

Just the other day I saw again the movie Saving Private Ryan. Near the end of the film Captain Miller, dying from a gunshot wound, tells Private Ryan, “Earn it.” At the end of the film we are returned to the beginning where the old man and his family are visiting the military cemetery above the beaches at Normandy. The old man turns out to be Private Ryan. Kneeling at Captain Miller’s grave he turns to his wife and says, “Tell me I’m a good man; that I’ve lived a good life.” While this question tugs at the emotions of the audience, I believe we are left with more questions than answers at the close of this film.

It would seem that Private Ryan carried a great deal of guilt for having survived when his savior dies. The question he asks is rhetorical, requiring no answer, unless, of course, Private Ryan’s life was anything but good. The fact that he had to ask this question of his wife, a person who would likely not tell him the truth if his life had been less than good, makes the question all the more absurd. One knows whether one has lived an ethical life, a life in which one fulfills one’s obligation to the other before thinking of oneself. One knows whether his or her life was earned rather than given simply by the measure of regret one has as time passes.

As I look back on my own life I am satisfied with my contributions to the world in which I live. I have no regrets and were I to drop dead in this very moment I would traverse into the unknown happy, joyous and free. This is not to say that I would do everything exactly the same if I were given the chance to do things over again; to the contrary, each mistake proved to be a tool for change. I learned, sometimes the hard way, that doing the same thing over and over expecting different results did not work for me. Learn from the mistakes, do things differently and one need not ask the question that Private Ryan asked in the end. He would simply know the answer so the question would be left unasked.

In war, as in life in general, events are random yet predictable through applied probabilities. If something can happen it will happen, we just don’t know when or to whom. One can calculate the odds in war as to how many people will die as a result of battles waged as well as how many will survive. While the probabilities do not say exactly which people will live and which will die, in the end the numbers are accurate. The fact that Captain Miller dies and Private Ryan lives to return to Normandy those many years later is a result of randomness and does not suggest any purpose in the two instances, rather, it confirms the very nature of the odds of survival. It is something like this quote from “Nuke” LaLoosh. “This [baseball] is a very simple game. You throw the ball, you catch the ball, you hit the ball. Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose, sometimes it rains.”

The point is, if you have to ask whether or not you have lived a good life, if you are a good person, chances are the answer is no. Private Ryan asked the wrong question and the audience is left without a resolution.

Response to the Demands We Do Not Create: Thinking In Jewish XXIX

I do not see reality as morally indifferent: reality, as Dewey saw, makes demands on us. Values may be created by human beings and human cultures, but I see them as made in response to demands that we do not create. (emphasis in original)
Hillary Putnam, Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life 

Response to the Demands We Do Not Create: Thinking In Jewish XXIX

Response to the Demands We Do Not Create: Thinking In Jewish XXIX

Hillary Putnam here makes an interesting distinction between human values, a subjective notion conditioned on the culture in which one lives, and moral decisions as a response to demands extant and separated from the values of cultural heritage. Yet he also argues that the attempt to discover the metaphysical essence of a thing, an emotion, or even of God is hopeless, not because it is difficult but because it is absurd. Rather than be limited by metaphysical questions that have no answer, one must adopt a sense of wonder, a sense that asks no philosophical questions rather it stands apart from rules and systems that philosophers and theologians build to justify the very essence of all kinds of stuff.

Putnam’s distinction follows from the work of Franz Rosenzweig and Ludwig Wittgenstein:

The absurdity of metaphysics is, accordingly, not something that Rosenzweig argues for, as Wittgenstein argues that one or another metaphysical explanation of how it is possible to follow a rule, or possible to refer to things, collapses into absurdity when carefully probed, but rather something that he tries to make us feel by ironic redescription. (emphasis in original)
Hillary Putnam, Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life

It seems to me that the distinction Putnam is making is one in which values/ethics are either born of metaphysics in which teleological attributes must be attached or from a rather impersonal, statistically pure realm of probability in which one will necessarily attach a level of absurdity to the whole affair. Either the demands we do not create are created with a purpose or those demands are created as the outcome of probabilities. In either case, the demands created are outside of the control of individual human beings, small groups of human beings, or whole societies or cultures of human beings. If created with a teleological purpose, then it is likely to be created by some form or another of a creator God; if, on the other hand, creation has no purpose, one can and, indeed, must simply turn away from the very idea of a creator God relying on the notion that the world we see today is the result not of a purposeful creator but the random actions of probabilities with no central purpose involved.

As I was sitting in Synagogue this morning (yes, this atheist Jew practices some rituals because I find them meditative, relaxing and it provides me with a sense of community that cannot be found elsewhere) I was reflecting on how to claim Judaism for myself without claiming the teleological sense of a creator God creating the universe and mankind with a purpose, one hidden from mankind for sure, but a purpose nevertheless. I find it quite interesting that on the one hand, Rabbi Mendel talks about not being able to describe God and on the other hand he can talk about the Torah as a book of instructions for life, even those instructions we cannot understand because we cannot understand the mind or essence of God himself.

Like Wittgenstein, I wondered how it is possible to follow rules that collapse into absurdity when carefully probed. While some of the rules make sense, many collapse on their face because they defy explanation. These are the rules that must be accepted at face value or not at all because they cannot stand up to investigation or analysis. Trying to understand the essence of these rules, those that defy explanation, is precisely what Wittgenstein means when he argues that they collapse into absurdity.

On the other hand, it can be successfully argued that when one attempts to analyze such rules rather than simply living the rules as a apart of a wonder filled life, one need not attempt deep analysis of rules or structures at all. One simply lives the life described and that is the end of that. No analysis needed.

I am not at that point. If something appears absurd on its face I choose to think of it as absurd. So how do I justify my attending Sabbath morning services while still professing an atheist stance? The very simple answer to that question rests on the very idea that even if there is no God, even if there is no purpose to the universe, even if the universe is an absurd random number generator run by probabilities, one still has the obligation to act as if there is a creator God. I can separate the idea of teleology, a metaphysical notion, from the idea of response-able ethical actions born of the essential formula that Rabbi Hillel once shared with a man asking him to describe the essence of Judaism while standing on one foot. Hillel replied, “What is hurtful to you do not do unto others. That is the whole Torah. All the rest is commentary. Now go and study.” This atheist Jew studies and partakes as if there is a God while holding on to the very idea that teleology is dead on arrival.

Henri Bergson and the Phenomenological Nature of Time

The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new.
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution p. 7

Henri Bergson and the Phenomenological Nature of Time

Henri Bergson and the Phenomenological Nature of Time

Is Bergson on to something here? What exactly does “duration means invention” mean? What does the creation of forms have to do with the perception of time? Finally, what can Bergson imply when he speaks of the “continual elaboration of the absolutely new?” If one also understands Bergson’s earlier comment that “duration [of time] coincides with my impatience” and that the consideration of time is “no longer something thought, it is something lived, then we may be able to make some sense of this phenomenological approach to time in a rational sense.

The idea that the measure of time, the duration of any given event in linear time is directly related to the impatience of the observer is a profound insight. How many times have you been in a situation in which you kept looking at your watch, time seemingly creeping along at a snail’s pace while other times things seem to fly by so fast that time itself is no longer an issue and you find no need to take a peek at your watch. Engaged behavior occurs in the absolute now while disengaged behavior, while still taking place in the now, occurs in the relative now because the end is elusive. It is here where the invention of duration is activated. When fully engaged, when concentration is at its peak, actions are deeply embedded in the now; time seems to stop and duration is not an issue. There is a Talmudic story about several sages at B’nai B’rak who spent all night discussing the Exodus from Egypt until one of their students interrupted reminding them that it was time for Morning Prayers. Here the passage of time made no difference and a reminder of an obligation had to be issued to close the productive discussion. Those times when time stands still, however, when things move so slowly that the clock never seems to advance, that is a wholly different story. Here one’s impatience dictates the speed of advancement of the clock, the duration of the activity, the scope of the project. In the former, time is a lived-experience while in the latter it is something thought and not lived.

When Bergson references the idea of the “continual elaboration of the absolutely new” he is, I think, arguing that the absolute duration of time is not only infinitely brief but that it is something never to be repeated in the experience of the individual. Furthermore, every unique individual experiences the same relative duration of time in his or her own unique manner. In short, each moment is unique for each being to be experienced in one’s own way as something new. This view of time is not unlike the post-modern view that the only experience that qualifies as existence is this very moment, the moment which is always already gone, never to be recovered except as an incomplete trace. And so we come to the idea of the “creation of forms.”

It is possible to understand Bergson’s notion of the “creation of forms” as being similar to the idea of laying down of traces serving as memory engrams, recalled nostalgically to create a past and even to project a future (although the idea of projecting goals is similar to the trace of memory it is likely to be mechanically different). As we invent duration, live our experiences, our absolutely new and unique experiences, we are creating traces or forms that allow us to understand time as linear and history as ‘real’ because we can recall a part of what occurred. Our recall, however, isn’t as focused as the experience itself, rather it is idealized to conform to the underlying story predicted by the prior laying down of traces, reminders of our lived-experience.

While Bergson seems to apply a teleological foundation to his ideas about time, the ideas are more attuned to a randomly constructed universe with no particular purpose in mind. These ideas work just as well, in fact even better, when teleology is removed from the equation. What is important to note, however, is that Bergson’s ideas are flexible enough to provide a base for understanding a non-teleological ethics based on responsibility for the other and embracing the absolute uniqueness of the other.

Intention, Action, Consequence: Thinking in Jewish XVI

Intention, Action, Consequence: Thinking in Jewish XVI

Intention, Action, Consequence: Thinking in Jewish XVI

Some things are beginning to emerge with some clarity, although I am not absolutely certain that my analysis is at all correct until I am able to run some ideas past Rabbi Mendel on Thursday. As I read Talmud with him and read some on my own as well I am struck by the consistency of analysis I am beginning to see unfold. In this post I want to discuss what I think of as preparatory rules of analysis. These rules focus primarily on secular and not religious definitions almost as if they were conceived by classical philosophy and not priests and rabbis. They set the stage for all behavior rather than define that which is holy or what must be done to insure holiness. Much of this is gaining clarity as I read from Tractate Shabbat, the rules for the Sabbath.

The first of these principles is human intention. In a nutshell, the rule for intention exempts from any and all liability for atonement acts that were performed that one would otherwise be liable for if they were performed without intentionality; one forgot it was the Sabbath and performed an otherwise forbidden action. The one caveat to this rule is that once the error was recognized the behavior must stop. To intentionally violate a Sabbath prohibition is strictly forbidden but if one violates more than one provision the liability extends only as if the combined acts constituted a single act and therefore a single liability is attached. In short, human motives play a large role in the attachment of liability.

Liability must flow from action and not merely thought. If three frogs were sitting on a log and two of them intended to jump off the log into the water, how many frogs remain on the log? The short answer is three because if intentions are not translated into specific action then the intention does not constitute a violation of actions prohibited. This seems so logical it almost hurts. Thinking is not punishable, period.

Violations of intent coupled with actions have consequences. To make this leap, the sages of the Mishnah and Talmuds adopt a teleological point of view that argues for historical purpose; that all of history in its separate and independent acts are all part of a larger plan, a purpose for the very existence of the universe and ultimately human beings. Taken to its logical outcome there must also be a time when history as we know it must end, the eschatological time, the end of time itself. Consequences, especially negative consequences, serve to mark the severity of the end of times. Consequences are both cumulative and generalized to the whole of the population. If only a small minority of the people violate prohibitions of any kind the entire population is likely to suffer. Punishments from God differ but they are always traceable back to a breakdown of ordered living into chaos, the very reverse of the process of creation itself.

The underlying purpose of these fundamental tools of analysis are in place to set the stage for the next three and much more deeply connected to religious life; space, time and prohibitions. Up to this point, it seems to me that these preliminary rules are deeply philosophical at their core and, while the argument is not made in such a way as to flow neatly from one point to the next, the argument is, nevertheless, identifiable and defensible. While I can quibble with the teleological view of history and the eschatological consequences of that very teleology, I am also able to understand the context in which it occurs. As one of the fundamental cornerstones of Rabbinic Judaism these preliminaries are found in all four of the tractates of Talmud Bavli I have read to date. I am less certain to agree with the next three which I will discuss next.

In the Pursuit of an Ordered Universe; The Teleological Conundrum

Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause, from that without which the cause would not be able to act, as a cause. It is what the majority appear to do, like people groping in the dark; they call it a cause, thus giving a name that does not belong to it. That is why one man surrounds the earth with a vortex to make the heavens keep it in place, another makes the air support it like a wide lid. As for their capacity of being in the best place they could be at this very time, they do not look for , nor do they believe it to have any divine force, but they believe that they will some time discover a stronger and more immortal Atlas to hold everything together more, and they do not believe that the truly good and binding’ binds and holds them together.
— Plato, Phaedo 99

In the Pursuit of an Ordered Universe; The Teleological Conundrum

In the Pursuit of an Ordered Universe; The Teleological Conundrum

Plato’s description of the teleological, the account holding that final causes exist in nature, providing an underlying systemic design to the very forces that mysteriously point to the divine, is a classical riddle leading human beings to project the eschatological end times; the design of a divine being whose enterprise of death, judgment, heaven and hell ends with apocalyptic transitions from one life to another. There is a teleological presumption that this design requires a creator, or at the very least a first cause creator, one with a thoughtful mind that plans and executes that plan over which human beings have little or no control. On this view, humans are prisoners of this design, powerless to affect the outcome of the planed end of times.

It seems that eschatological programs dominate major religions of the world. Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Islamic, Jewish, and Zoroastrian eschatology dominate their respective belief systems. Most of the modern eschatological thinking is dominated by a violent disruption, even the destruction, of the world. Jewish and Christian eschatological understanding sees the end times as the perfection of God’s creation of the world; God created the world for a purpose and is constantly moving toward the final goal of this creation. For Jews, the end times will be noted when the messiah presents himself to the world. For the Christians the end times come when the messiah returns to the world. In either case, the end times, the perfection of creation means the end of the world as we know it; even, perhaps the destruction of the world and the end of everything.

Teleological eschatology presents a mix of optimistic joy and pessimistic terror, with pessimism holding most of the good cards. Even true believers will suffer in the end of times; the inevitability of which is programmed into the plan of which only God is certain. So we constantly face predictions of the end of the world, the most recent of which was the Mayan Apocalypse but this prediction is not isolated in the minds of those who believe in the very idea of a linear path from creation to destruction, a plan conceived by some creator God (or gods) or another to explain that which is difficult to explain.

There is, however, a significant problem with the teleological insistence on God having a plan for everything. It simply doesn’t mesh with science. Let me explore some teleological arguments juxtaposed against a single scientific program, evolution. While I do not claim this analysis as a comprehensive one, I do claim it to be a good faith, albeit brief, summary of some key ideas. One claim of those who embrace religious eschatology is that their system explains reality. Evolution, on the other hand, only claims to be an explanation of the development of life on earth without looking at or making claims about origins. Evolution or natural selection is a random process over which no design appears to dominate. Natural selection eschews the very notion of supernatural intervention into the process of biological changes while their religious counterparts claim supernatural intervention through a creation ex nihilo that is static and unchanging. Teleological eschatology claims a purpose for creation where evolution understands the world in terms of its very randomness, a randomness that creates biological diversity in constant flux; changes that are not instantaneous, rather that occur over long periods of time, far longer than the span of a human lifetime. Finally, teleological eschatology claims that the only way to avoid the ultimate catastrophic end of times is to do God’s will as they describe the will of God. Natural selection makes no such claim; it claims that biological changes are responses to environmental conditions that, in turn, provide a context to insure survival. These conditions and contexts are not part of some grand scheme but, rather, are random natural events occurring over time.

While teleological eschatology appears rational to many, it has a distinct flaw that cannot be overcome. It is dependent on its own rationale, its tautological dependence on its own sacred texts that somehow, when taken together, make up (yes, the pun is intended) a belief system that cannot be questioned. The belief system feeds upon itself, taking ancient proof texts to prove that the hand of God permeates everything. When questioned, the system falls apart. Proving the existence of God, Thomas Aquinas tells us, is fully dependent on one’s prior belief in that God without which all proofs fail. If belief is required for proof then one has a system that, on its face, is tautological in the sense that it uses a set of self-reinforcing statements or claims that are not subject to refutation; in short, using different words to say the same thing.

In the end, teleological systems fail, not because they are not rational for their internal rationality is often quite exquisite, rather they fail because they feed only upon themselves without opening the door to distinctly rational, observable, and replicable understandings.

Drawing Conclusions: Thinking in Jewish VIII

What happens when one dies?
Rabbi Mendel, in conversation

Drawing Conclusions: Thinking in Jewish VIII

Drawing Conclusions: Thinking in Jewish VIII

After the Parsha class last evening, several of us were talking about some of the problematics raised during the discussion of mutton Torah (the gift of the Torah and not the revelation at Sinai because tradition holds that the Torah was already known to the Jewish people having been taught to Abraham and then passed down through all subsequent generations). One of those problematics was the notion that every Jewish soul was present at Sinai, even those unborn souls, at the exact point when God descended from his heavens and Moses ascended to God’s mountain. The very idea of a soul became the point of the after class discussion. Rabbi Mendel was making the point that a creator God created the soul in order for there to be a ‘spark’ of life infused into every living creature, great or small; that that ‘spark’ or soul ascends to a different level of existence when the body dies. He was questioned vigorously by a member of the group (not me) trying to come to grips with the very idea of the existence (even pre-existence if the idea that all souls living, dead and yet unborn were present at Sinai) of the soul. It was at that point the question quoted above was raised. I’m sorry in advance, but Rabbi Mendel’s argument is what is famously known as one of those false logical arguments that philosophers call the argument from incredulity; that argument goes basically like this: I cannot even imagine something different therefore what I believe must be true. Let me explore this for a few moments.

Let me first assume there is a creator God for the sake of argument. Let me also assume that this creator God is at once omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent (all powerful, all knowing and loving/merciful). If, and only if (iff) this is true does the very existence of a soul begin to make any sense at all but the jury remains out on the truth of this kind of a creator God. If God is all these things then how is it the God cannot build a mountain that God itself cannot move? The very idea that this is possible, even in the face of countless described miracles where God alters nature described in Scripture, then the creator God cannot be omnipotent. Strike one! If the creator God is all knowing how is it possible for man to have choices, to exercise free will? This questions both the omniscience and omnipotence of the creator God. If the creator God knows all possible outcomes then man can only have the illusion of free will, the simulacrum of moral and ethical choice because both the choice and the outcome are already known by the omniscient creator God. If, as theologians argue, the creator God gives mankind free will it surrenders some of its power rendering itself no longer omnipotent and some of its knowledge rendering itself no longer omniscient. Strike two! As to benevolence, the creator God is responsible for the commonplace as well as the extraordinary suffering of all life on earth. In the face of massive genocides of the 19th and 20th Centuries, where was this benevolent creator God. Either the creator God was unable to stop the genocides in which case the creator God was impotent not omnipotent or the creator God was unwilling to stop the genocides in which case the creator God is unmerciful at best and a sadist at the very worst. Strike Three.

Simply on the basis of the evidence briefly described above, the question of a creator God remains a moot point. Perhaps there is a force that is something akin to Aristotle’s Prime Mover, but even that is a circular argument that ends only because, incredulously, Aristotle himself, after circling back in time comes to a point where he cannot imagine that there was creation ex nihilo (creating something from nothing), hence he concludes that there must have been something that lit the flame of the universe and all creation, else why would anything at all exist. But just because one cannot imagine creato ex nihilo doesn’t mean that there aren’t alternative solutions to creation. Two come to mind. First there is the idea of creato ex materia or creation from some pre-existing, eternal material force that has not yet been identified. Then, of course, the theological favorite, creato ex deo or the creation out of the very voice of God. These are three competing voices to explain the creation of the universe, none of which are inevitable but perhaps only one of which is supported by cosmologists; the idea of the Big Bang is, in fact, an argument for creato ex nihilo. By isolating one of the other two possible explanations for the creation of the universe and all that is within it and suggesting that it is the only reasonable explanation is to argue from incredulity. The failure to address competing arguments is, at the very least, an argument that leaves reasonable doubt in my mind.

So if the question of the existence of a creator God can be called into doubt, which is not to say that there is no creator God, merely that there is not enough positive evidence extant to support such a God and more than enough evidence extant to deny such a God, then to base the existence of the divine soul on the idea of creato ex deo to the exclusion of all other possibilities is not persuasive. The internal argument for creato ex deo in Judaism is based exclusively in Scripture. It is a theological argument based in a mythological explanation for that which was thought to be completely outside the ken of human understanding. As an ethical story the whole idea of creation arising from the spoken word of the creator God may have ethical and moral lessons to be learned about the genesis of everything but given the state of scientific knowledge it is a story that can only be understood as metaphor and not as revealed truth. If that is the case, the argument for the existence of a soul, even a repository for all souls dead, living and yet unborn, makes little sense except teleologically. If there is, however, real evidence to show my analysis to be wrong, then I am obligated to explore that evidence for its credulity and either accept it or reject it as warranted or not warranted. I would reject as unwarranted any assertions that are only based on Scriptural writings or commentaries on Scriptural writing, not because it is incredulous, rather because it is steeped in that which it purports to prove leaving no room for alternatives.

As I told Rabbi Mendel last night, it would take an awful lot of persuasion to get me to accept the existence of an eternal soul leaving the door open to being persuaded.

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